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Joining by Number:
Military Intervention in Civil Wars
Zachary C. Shirkey
Hunter College–CUNY
Understanding why and when states militarily intervene in civil
wars is crucial. Intervention can increase civil wars’ severity and
the strategies employed in civil wars are shaped by the possibility
of military intervention. This article argues that potential military
interveners react to information revealed about warring parties’
intentions and relative power. Without revealed information,
potential military interveners are unlikely to reconsider their initial
decision to remain out of the war. Revealed information causes
non-belligerent states to update their expectations about the
trajectory of the civil war causing them, at times, to change their
calculus about the benefits of belligerency and thus intervene. This
helps explain why civil wars spread and when they do so. This
explanation is tested using generalized estimating equations on a
new dataset of unexpected events for the civil wars in the
Correlates of War Intrastate War and PRIO Armed Conflict
datasets.
States often worry that civil wars, such as the ongoing Syrian conflict, will draw in
outside military forces.1 Such concerns about military intervention in civil wars are quite
reasonable—three fifths of civil wars experience some level of outside involvement, often by
multiple states (Findley and Teo 2006). Previous studies have found that outside involvement
can alter the outcome, duration, and severity of civil wars making understanding the dynamics of
intervention important for both humanitarian and strategic reasons (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline
2000; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010; Regan 2000; 2002; Regan and Aydin 2006). It may be
impossible to fully understand how and why civil wars occur, are fought, and end without
understanding why and when military intervention occurs. Yet the timing of military intervention
in particular is poorly understood.
I would like to thank Henk-Jan Brinkman, John Harden, Michael Lee, Zachary Malitz, Madalene O’Donnell, Gary
Uzonyi, and Alex Weisiger for their help. The research was funded in part by PSC-CUNY grants 64029-00 42 and
65525-00 43.
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This article aims to fill that void using insights derived from the bargaining model of war.
It argues civil wars are bargaining processes and that events within civil wars, such as battles,
reveal information. This information causes outside states to update their expectations about the
outcome of the war and the benefits of intervention. In particular, it argues that unexpected
events within wars reveal information which causes states to reevaluate the merits of military
intervention. The article finds that is indeed the case as military intervention is correlated with
and likely caused by unexpected military events and that events of greater magnitude are more
strongly correlated with intervention than are lesser events. This is a significant contribution to
the literature as it helps explain not only why states intervene, but when they are likely to do so.
It differs from prior explanations of intervention as they have tended to focus on which states are
likely to join rather than on when intervention is likely to occur. The article also finds that such
unexpected events are correlated with and likely causal of states’ exits from civil wars and the
termination of those wars.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. First, the literature on military intervention
in civil wars is reviewed. Next, I construct a new theory of intervention based on revealed
information. Then, using a series of generalize estimating equations on a new dataset of
unexpected events for civil wars in the Correlates of War (COW) Intrastate War dataset, the
article shows that military intervention is correlated with and probably caused by unexpected
events. These findings are confirmed by more limited tests on unexpected events data for the
civil wars in the PRIO Armed Conflict dataset. Last, the article concludes and considers potential
avenues for future research.
The Gap in Our Understanding of Military Intervention
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Prior work has produced several findings in regards to military intervention. First,
scholars have found the nearer a state is to a war, the more likely it will intervene as the conflict
would be more salient and intervention logistically easier (Aydin 2012; Kathman 2010; Leeds
2005; Regan 2000; Shirkey 2009; 2012; Siverson and Starr 1991; Wallensteen and Sollenberg
1998). Second, great powers are more likely to intervene due to their greater ability to influence
the outcome of wars and greater logistical capacity (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Aydin
2012; Findley and Teo 2006; Shirkey 2009; 2012; Siverson and Starr 1991). Third, allies of
belligerents (Findley and Teo 2006; Joyce, Ghosn, and Bayer 2014; Melin and Koch 2010;
Shirkey 2009; Siverson and Starr 1991) and fourth, states with cross border ethnic ties (Khosla
1999; Saideman 1997) are more likely to intervene. While important in illuminating which states
intervene, by focusing on time invariant structural variables, these findings tell us little about
when intervention is likely to occur.
In order to explain the timing of intervention, this article builds on arguments that
changes in relative power between belligerents help explain alignment shifts within civil wars in
ways that static variables simply cannot (Christia 2012), that wars are bargaining processes, and
that wars are mechanisms for revealing information. It argues that shifts in power and changes in
intentions, as revealed by events within civil wars, cause states to reconsider their earlier
decisions about whether or not to intervene. This in turn often prompts intervention and explains
why states would reverse their prior decision to not join the war. States act on this revealed
information in response to a variety of motives including perceived opportunities to revise the
status quo, the desire to join one side for their own protection, a need to balance, and a desire to
affect the outcome of the wars they enter (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Gent 2008;
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Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008). Thus, revealed information helps explain why civil wars
experience military intervention and the timing of that intervention.
This argument is related to, yet distinct from, two other works that have looked at the
connection between third parties, belligerents, and events within civil wars. Gleditsch and
Beardsley (2004) use event analysis to show that outside third parties are able to bring pressure
on belligerent parties and change those parties’ behaviors in an attempt to influence the outcome
of the conflict. Similarly, Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997) use events data to show that in the
Bosnian Civil War outside parties attempting to influence the conflict changed their military and
diplomatic tactics in response to battlefield events. This article differs from those studies in that
it examines the timing of intervention, focuses narrowly on military intervention, and roots
intervention more explicitly within the bargaining model of war.
Revealed Information and Military Intervention
All wars, including civil wars, are dynamic, evolving processes which clarify the
distribution of power, goals, and reservation prices of the belligerents. In other words, wars are a
continuation of bargaining in which information is revealed and costs imposed causing the range
of acceptable bargains for all parties to shift (Fearon 1995; Goemans 2000; Smith 1998; Wagner
2000). As belligerent powers learn, they continuously weigh the value of proposed offers against
the expected value of continued bargaining. Here learning means the updating of expectations in
the light of new information or “a change of beliefs (or degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) …
as a result of observation and interpretation of experience.” (Levy 1994, 283). This learning
leads belligerents to alter both their alignments with their fellow belligerents and their demands
until an agreement acceptable to all sides is reached (Christia 2012; Cunningham 2010). The lack
of such an agreement, tacit or otherwise, is what causes war (Goemans 2000).
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Non-belligerent states view ongoing wars in much the same manner (Balch-Lindsay and
Enterline 2000) meaning that civil wars will prompt intervention if an agreement, tacit or
otherwise, between a belligerent and a non-belligerent unravels (Cunningham 2010). New
information may reveal a need to balance, an opportunity to pick up spoils, or a chance to alter
the war’s outcome. These dangers and opportunities can be revealed by information about
relative strengths, states’ intentions, and probable costs. Such information is most likely to be
revealed by battles and significant changes in the composition of governments and rebel groups,
though other events within civil wars could reveal information as well. While such information
would be more difficult for an outsider to obtain than for a belligerent, events in civil wars reveal
significant information to non-belligerents through such sources as military observers,
intelligence services, journalists, and refugees. Thus, events within civil wars change the range
of acceptable settlements for all parties, including for non-belligerent states, and may prompt
non-belligerent states to intervene.
For example, take a scenario where C may intervene on A’s behalf, in a civil war
between A and B. Events in the civil war can change the probability of C having military success
if it were to join the war on behalf of A and also change the probable settlement of that war. This
new probable settlement may be more or less acceptable to C than the previously anticipated
settlement. Therefore, events in the ongoing war between A and B should change the range of
acceptable settlements between C and B that would keep C out of the war and hence the
likelihood that C will join. See Table I.
[Table 1]
Therefore, military intervention can be thought of as occurring in the following manner.
At the beginning of a civil war states decide whether or not to become belligerents. Thereafter
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states become privy to new information revealed by the civil war which alters their beliefs about
the probable course of the war, how the war will affect them, and what the effects and costs of
intervention would likely be. These new beliefs cause states to update their expected benefits of
belligerency relative to peace. As a result, states could be prompted to intervene shortly after
information which changes their calculations is revealed.
What sort of events should reveal information to third parties? While some expected
events may reveal information, many such events will not as they will be consistent with states’
expectations. Unexpected events, however, should be particularly good indicators of when states
will join ongoing wars as they cut against prior expectations. For this reason, I use unexpected
events as a proxy for revealed information.2 An example of an unexpected event would be the
advance by rebel groups into southern Mali in 2012. The international community expected that
the group, while triumphant in the north, would be checked by the Malian army from advancing
south toward the capital of Bamako (Brode 2012). This expectation proved incorrect; thus the
initially successful advance into the southern half of the country is an unexpected event—one
which in fact triggered French intervention. Similarly, the Saudi intervention into the ongoing
Yemeni civil war was triggered by the surprisingly successful advance by Houthi militias into
the capital, Sana’a.
H1: Unexpected events should be correlated with and precede military intervention.
Naturally, not all unexpected events are created equal. Some are more important than
others. For instance in the American Revolution, the British suffering very high casualties at the
Battle of Bunker Hill was unexpected, but still a British victory of sorts. On the other hand, an
entire British army surrendering at Saratoga was a major, surprising defeat. Such larger scale
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Unexpected events are defined in the “Methodology and Results” section.
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events will have more influence on the likelihood of intervention as they indicate that the balance
of forces and likely settlement are farther from what states expected.
H2: Events of greater magnitude will be more strongly correlated with intervention than
events of lesser magnitude.
Additionally, it is possible that political events—such as protests or changes in the
composition of the government—would have a different effect than military events. Both types
of events would reveal information about states’ intentions, but military events are directly tied
to the balance of forces. This difference should result in military events having a greater effect
on the likelihood of intervention.
H3: Military events will be more strongly correlated with intervention than political
events will be.
Several caveats are in order. First, revealed information is a probabilistic cause, rather
than a sufficient cause. Only revealed information that makes joining appear more attractive
would increase the probability of intervention. Revealed information which is consistent with
non-belligerents’ original estimates3 or which makes joining the civil war appear less attractive
would not increase the likelihood of intervention.
Second, states need to have a great deal at stake in order for new information to trigger
belligerency. Even though all states would receive the same new information, they are not all
equally likely to join. As discussed above, previous studies of intervention have found that states
which are great powers, geographically proximate, or allied to a belligerent are more likely to
join. Thus, politically relevant states should be more likely to intervene in response to
unexpected events.
Third, if revealed information alters the desirability of belligerency, it follows that such
events could cause states to exit as well as join wars (Shirkey 2009). Thus, revealed information
3

Confirming evidence could prompt risk averse states to intervene by increasing the certainty of states’ estimates.
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should lead to both intervention and war termination. As military intervention obviously cannot
occur after a war’s termination, revealed information could censor cases and possibly be
negatively correlated with military intervention. This seems especially likely to be true after
unexpected events of great magnitude as such events would often leave leaders with the choice
of seeking peace or risking military collapse.
H4: Unexpected events will be correlated with states exiting wars and with war
termination.
Last, some may object to the argument that revealed information can cause wars to
spread since private information is a rationalist cause of war (Fearon 1995) and thus conclude
revealing information should always lead to peace, not war. This objection is based on the false
notion that given war is a mechanism for revealing information, the less private information
there is the less likely war is to occur. This can easily be shown to be false. For example, the
discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 was a case of private information being revealed,
but it increased rather than reduced the likelihood of war as it raised questions about Soviet
intentions. Recent formal work has also shown that revealed information can increase the odds of
war (Arena and Wolford 2012).
Thus, revealed information helps explain the timing of military intervention in civil wars
and provides a motive for that intervention. It does this by revealing potential threats and
opportunities to non-belligerent states and changing their beliefs about the merits of belligerency.
This argument is tested using generalized estimating equations (GEE) on two new datasets of
unexpected events in civil wars in the COW Intrastate War and PRIO Armed Conflict datasets.
Methodology and Results
While informationalist arguments of intervention in civil wars have been examined using
case studies (Shirkey 2012), they have not been subjected to statistical analysis. To remedy this
8

the hypotheses advanced above are tested on the 334 civil wars from 1816 to 2008 in the
Correlates of War (COW) Intrastate War Dataset version 4.1 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) and
the 235 civil wars from 1946 to 2008 in the PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002;
Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008) using GEE models to examine the likelihood of
intervention and non-proportional hazard models with a Weibull distribution to examine the
likelihood of war termination and state exit. The structure of the data, specifically whether a case
represents a non-belligerent war-month, war-month, or belligerent war-month varies by model
and will be discussed below as the models are introduced. Prior to justifying the model
specifications, the variables will be described.
Description of the Variables
In Models 1 through 7 the dependent variable is whether a non-belligerent state joined the
civil war in a given month after the war’s first 30 days as coded by the COW and PRIO datasets.4
The 30 day delay is included so as to not conflate the findings with states which joined
immediately based on the situation ante bellum rather than due to information revealed by the
war. For Models 8 and 10, which examine whether or not unexpected events are correlated with
war termination, the dependent variable is whether the civil war ended in a given month. It was
taken directly from COW and PRIO. Given that civil wars often recur, the incidence of war
termination is greater than the number of wars as civil wars can end more than once. In Model 9,
the dependent variable is whether a belligerent state exited the war in a given month as coded in
the COW dataset.
Unexpected events are the main independent variable. They are non-trivial events which
surprised contemporaries. The unexpected events variable ranges from zero to three. A zero
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Since multiple states often join the same civil war in the same month, there are more instances of intervention in
the non-belligerent war-month dataset than in the war-month dataset.
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indicates no unexpected event occurred, while a positive number indicates an unexpected event
did occur. The level of the event (one to three) indicates the impact of the event on the military
balance of power or the composition and strength of a state’s government and polity. Thus, a
higher number indicates the event had more of an impact on the course of the war, not that it was
more surprising. A Level One event indicates a military performance that was marginally better
or worse than expected, surprising important but localized protests and rioting, or deaths of
leaders that did not appear likely to alter government policy. Level Two events are major
surprising victories or defeats short of a rout, unexpected leadership changes that are likely to
significantly alter government policy, and widespread rioting or protests which significantly
weaken a government’s legitimacy or capabilities. Level Three events are unexpected routs
which result in the destruction of large portions of an army or fleet or surprising domestic
political events which threaten to topple the government. Such events do not have to knock a
state out of the war, but they do have to result in serious damage to one side’s capabilities, not
just a retreat.
Unexpected events were also categorized as being military or political in nature with
military events occurring on the battlefield, while political events occurred away from the
battlefield. Both military and political events were recorded for wars in the COW dataset while
only military events were recorded for wars in the PRIO dataset. To give an intuitive sense of the
variable, examples of events of each type and magnitude which should be familiar to most
readers are listed in Table II and a full list of COW events can be found in the supplemental
materials online and for PRIO events not already recorded in the COW dataset. For the COW
dataset, this coding method resulted in 663 unexpected political events and 578 unexpected
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military events across 334 civil wars. For the PRIO dataset, it results in 797 unexpected military
events across 235 wars.
[Table II]
Unexpected events were coded primarily using the Annual Register, a British serial
beginning in the late 18th century. The use of a contemporaneous source helped to determine if
events were indeed unexpected. An unexpected event was determined to have occurred if the text
indicated surprise on the part of third parties or the journalist recording the event who was
treated as a proxy for broader opinion. While not a perfect proxy, it was impossible to collect
data on the expectations of all non-belligerent states. For civil wars that received scant or no
coverage in the Register—mostly 19th century Asian and Latin American civil wars—other
sources were used to supplement the Register. This use of supplemental sources helped to ensure
that more data was not collected on more prominent civil wars—the very civil wars which might
be more likely to experience intervention—than for less prominent wars. Thus, these additional
sources helped to avoid introducing bias through the availability of data (see Chojnacki et al
2012). A list of these sources plus a fuller discussion of the coding can be found in the
supplemental material online.
In the regressions below, the Any Event variable indicates whether or not an unexpected
event of any type occurred in that month or the previous three months. Likewise the Military
Event and Political Event variables indicate if an unexpected military or political event occurred
in that or the previous three months. The Level One, Two, and Three Event variables indicate if
an event of that magnitude occurred. These levels were broken into three dichotomous variables
as the effect of moving from one event level to another is unlikely to be equal, and therefore, it is
inappropriate to treat it as a continuous or interval variable. The variables are all lagged to allow
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states time to update their expectations and react to the information revealed by the event.5 To
make sure the results are not sensitive to the length of the lag the regressions were also run using
one, two, and four months lags for the events variables in addition to the three month lag
reported in the tables. In general, the events variables are robust to the different lags. Instances of
the lag chosen mattering are discussed below in the results for the affected model.
There are several control variables. First, the civil war’s duration is measured in months
up to the current month and was taken directly from COW and PRIO. Second, whether or not a
given war-month occurred during the Cold War—coded as between May 1945 and December
1991 inclusive—was included as previous work suggests that proxy wars during that era altered
the nature of outside intervention (Tillema 1994). Third, the location of the civil war is captured
by a series of dummy variables for Europe, Asia and Oceania, and Africa as the rate of
intervention may vary by region (Adebajo 2011). The Western Hemisphere is the residual
category. Fourth, the literature suggests that civil wars involving great powers are less likely to
attract intervention (Aydin 2012). Therefore, whether or not a great power was involved in the
civil war in a given month is recorded. The list of great powers was taken from COW. Fifth,
whether an outside state had already intervened was controlled for. This variable is taken directly
from COW and PRIO depending on the dataset being used. Finally, Satana (2006) suggests the
regime type of the target state matters. Accordingly, whether or not a democracy was involved in
the civil war was determined using the Polity IV regime dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2007) by
subtracting the autocracy index from the democracy index. Regimes with a score of six or higher
are a coded as a democracy. The descriptive statistics can be seen in Tables IIIa through IIId.6
[Tables IIIa, IIIb, IIIc, and IIId]
5

Lags also help avoid serial correlation in the error term (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997).
The various levels and types of unexpected events do not sum to the total number of unexpected events as lagging
these variables creates overlaps in some months.
6
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Methodology
As the dependent variable is dichotomous, care is required when selecting the appropriate
model. Dichotomous dependent variables are best treated using logistic regressions. As the focus
of the study is the likelihood of whether intervention will occur in a given month, maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) with a binomial functional form—either logit or probit—would
seem the obvious choice.
There are serious problems, however, with MLE models given the nature of the data.
States’ decisions about intervention are likely neither temporally nor spatially independent of
each other. For example, the lack of intervention in January presumably affects the likelihood
intervention would occur in February. Additionally, one state entering the civil war affects the
probability another will intervene (Leeds 2005). This lack of independence violates a key
assumption of MLE models. Normally this could be controlled for by using temporal splines
(Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). This, however, is impossible as the unexpected events variables
are lagged. A random effects logit model is another potential option (Lee and Thompson 2013).
The Wooldridge test, however, suggests that autocorrelation in the data cannot be ruled out, thus
violating an assumption of logit models (Drukker 2003).
For this reason, GEE models were chosen. GEEs were developed out of generalized
linear models and have several advantages. First, they are able to control for temporal
dependency and autocorrelation while still incorporating lagged variables (Zorn 2001).7 GEEs
can also cluster a set of observations thereby partially controlling for spatial dependence.
Coefficients in GEE models are interpreted in the same manner as coefficients in any logistic
regression. Also, the Huber-White method of calculating robust standard errors can be used in
The asymptotic consistency of the βs estimated by GEE models holds even if the exact nature of the intra-cluster
relationship is unknown. Thus, it is not necessary to know precisely how certain observations are causally linked to
control for interdependence.
7
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GEE models. While the errors are asymptotically robust to misspecification in the covariance
structure, they are not robust in regards to the conditional mean of Y given X. Thus, they are
only “semi-robust.” Therefore a GEE model with a logistic binomial functional form which
clusters observations for a given non-belligerent over a particular war (Models 1 and 2) or a
simply for a given war (Models 3 through 7) was used. For Models 8 through 10, which examine
the effect of unexpected events on war termination and states exiting wars, a non-proportional
hazards model with a Weibull distribution was used as several of the control variables violate the
proportional hazards assumption. Non-proportional hazard models allow variables to influence
both the shape and scale parameters of the regression. Only those variables which influence the
shape in a statistically significant way were included in the shape function to avoid obscuring the
scale effects for other variables (Cleves et al 2008).
Results
In Models 1 and 2 a case represents a war-month for each non-belligerent state. In other
words, a case is created for every month that a given state is not in the civil war in question. For
example, every month that the United States was a non-belligerent during the Spanish Civil War
constitutes a case. If a non-belligerent state joins a civil war it is omitted from the analysis for
that civil war for as long as it remains in the war. States in which the civil war occurred are
always excluded even if only non-state actors were listed as belligerents in COW. This results
over one million cases. When employing a logistic model, including so many cases introduces a
bias towards underestimating the likelihood if the dependent variable is a rare event like
intervention. To avoid introducing bias it is best practice to sample in part on the dependent
variable (King and Zeng 2001) and pare down the data by focusing on politically relevant dyads.
Therefore, for Models 1 and 2 only politically relevant non-belligerent states were included—
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great powers, contiguous states, and states which actually intervened. This results in a more
manageable number of cases (87,530). This paring down of the data is not repeated in the later
models which have far fewer cases. Coefficients and semi-robust standard errors are reported.
See Table IV.
[Table IV]
As can be seen in Model 1 of Table IV, both duration and unexpected events are
statistically significant. Longer lags do not affect the variables’ significance, but for shorter lags
the variable is only significant at the 0.10 level. All of the marginal effects are small given the
large number of cases. Such low substantive effects are typical of rare events models. Obviously,
it is rare for any given state, even a politically relevant one, to intervene in any given month.
Still, the occurrence of an unexpected event increases the odds of intervention more than
fourfold, from 0.0235% to 0.099%, holding duration at its mean and the other controls at their
median. See Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
As can be seen in Model 2, both military and political events drive the findings for
unexpected events in Model 1, though political events are not significantly correlated with late
joining if a shorter lag is used (they do remain significant with the longer four month lag).
Military events remain significant with both shorter and longer lags. Military events increase
likelihood by 3.5 times (from 0.028% to 0.099%) while political events roughly double the
likelihood to 0.053% (see Figure 1). In all models duration is significantly correlated with a
reduction in the likelihood of intervention while the Cold War is not statistically significant.
Peacekeeping is correlated with further intervention in Models 1 and 2, but not in later models.
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Another way to think about the puzzle of intervention is to think about when a given civil
wars experiences outside intervention as opposed to when a given state joins that war. This
means the data can be structured as war-months rather than as non-belligerent war-months
(Models 3–7). For example, in these models each month of the Spanish Civil War is a single
case. This reduces the number of cases allowing all cases to be considered without introducing
bias. Again GEE models were used and duration and the Cold War were included as control
variables. To these were added the region the civil war was in, whether the civil war had been
internationalized, whether a great power was a belligerent, and whether a democracy was a
belligerent. The results can be seen in Models 3 through 5 in Table IV. Coefficients and semirobust standard errors are reported.
Once again unexpected events are correlated with intervention (Model 3) and it is
military events which drive the results (Model 4). Again holding the other variables at their
median or mean the occurrence of an unexpected event increases the odds of joining nearly two
and a half times (0.127% from 0.052%). Unexpected events are not significant if a shorter lag is
used in Model 3, but they are if a longer lag is used. Military events increase the odds of
intervention to 0.152% from 0.051%, an almost threefold increase (see Figure 2). The result is
not dependent on the lag chosen. Political events are neither statistically or substantive
significant.
[Figure 2]
As can be seen from the χ2, the fit of these models is much better than before despite
having far fewer cases. Some of this is due to the new control variables. First, it matters where
the civil war occurs. Civil wars in Europe and Africa are significantly more likely to experience
intervention than civil wars elsewhere. In Model 3, they increase the odds of joining in any given
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month to 0.201% and 0.148% respectively. Model 4 produces similar effects, with Europe and
Africa increasing the odds to 0.223% and 0.145% respectively. Also, civil wars involving
democracies are more likely to have outside states join (0.129% in Model 3 and 0.132% in
Model 4), but those involving great powers are less likely to experience intervention with the
odds dropping to 0.014% in both Models 3 and 4. As before duration is negatively correlated
with intervention and the Cold War has no effect. Whether the war was already internationalized
through prior interventions and the number of neighboring states also have no effect.
Last, how different magnitude events affect the likelihood of intervention is considered
(Model 5). As can be seen, Level Two events are correlated with intervention as expected. They
raise the odds of joining from 0.059% to 0.207% a three and a half fold increase (see Figure 2).
Level One events, however, are not correlated with intervention. This runs against the work’s
hypothesis to some extent as it is a negative finding for unexpected events, but given that it was
also hypothesized that events of a higher magnitude were more likely to cause joining than lesser
events, the result is not particularly surprising. What is surprising, however, is that Level Three
events are perfectly correlated with non-intervention requiring that they be omitted from the
model.8 There are several things to take from this. First, such events are very rare. Despite their
strong negative correlation with intervention, when aggregated with events of lesser magnitude,
unexpected events as a whole are correlated with intervention (Models 1 through 4). Second,
recall that unexpected events not only cause non-belligerent states to reconsider their decisions
about war and peace, but they also cause belligerent states to do the same. Given that Level
Three events are truly massive blows to one side of a civil war, it would not be surprising if such
events either knocked belligerents out of the war or caused them to negotiate an end to the
conflict. Thus, Level Three events could be censoring the chance for intervention by ending the
8

The results for the control variables remain essentially unchanged.
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war. Theoretically, lower level events should also be correlated with the war termination, but not
to the level of high magnitude events thus often leaving an opportunity for intervention to occur.
As will be seen below in Models 8 through 10 (Tables VI and VII) this is exactly what is
happening.
As a robustness check, unexpected military events were coded for the civil wars in the
PRIO dataset in case there were concerns that given the different sets of wars in COW and PRIO,
the results might not transfer. As can be seen in Models 6 and 7 (Table V) there appears to be
little reason to worry. Unexpected military events were significantly correlated with intervention
and these results were driven largely by Level Two rather than Level One events. 9 Once again,
Level Three events are perfectly correlated with non-intervention and have to be omitted, but as
suggested above and seen below it is because such events drive states to exit wars thereby
censoring any chance for intervention. The results for some of the control variables are changed.
Prior internationalization of the war is now correlated with further intervention and the Cold War
has a significant, negative effect on the likelihood of intervention. This latter result is probably a
product of the greater tendency toward intervention in the post-Cold War period while the Cold
War period does not look particularly exceptional in comparison to the 19th Century—a period
not included in the PRIO dataset. Also in Model 7, the number of neighboring states is positively
correlated with intervention.
[Table V]
As mentioned above, unexpected events should cause belligerents to reconsider
remaining in the war just as they cause non-belligerents to consider joining. Models 8 through 10
show that this is indeed the case (Tables VI and VII). Control variables are included for the war’s

9

Military events are only significant at the 0.10 level with shorter lags in Model 6. The lag chosen does not affect
any events variables in Model 7.
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region (DeRouen and Sobek 2009; Fearon 2004), whether the conflict had been internationalized
(Regan 2002), regime type (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; DeRouen and Sobek 2009;
Fearon 2004), the Cold War (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010), and great power status. These controls
are operationalized in the same manner as in previous models. A non-proportional hazards model
using a Weibull distribution is used as some of the variables violated the assumption of
proportional hazards making Cox models inappropriate. Those variables which violate the
proportional hazards assumption are allowed to affect both the scale and the shape of the
regression function. Coefficients and robust standard errors are reported.
Models 8 and 10 look at war termination using the COW and PRIO datasets respectively.
Each case is a war-month. Model 9 uses the COW dataset and looks at states exiting wars as it is
possible for interveners to leave a civil war before that war ends. Therefore, each case in Model
9 represents a belligerent war-month. So for example, every month Italy was involved in the
Spanish Civil War would be a case.
For the COW dataset for war termination (Model 8), both Level Two and especially
Level Three events increase the odds civil wars will end, though the result for Level Two events
is sensitive to the lag specification—it ceases to be significant with either a shorter or longer
lag—whereas the result for Level Three events holds using both longer and shorter lags.
Importantly, the size of the effect for Level Three events is more than large enough to explain
why such events were negatively correlated with intervention in the previous model. Wars
experiencing a Level Three event are over six times more likely to terminate within the next four
months than if such an event had not occurred. Model 9 looks at if unexpected events increase
the odds that states will exit the civil war. Again, Level Three events significant increase the
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odds of exit—in this case over fourfold.10 Last, in the PRIO dataset (Model 10), both Level Two
and Level Three events significantly increase the odds of war termination.11 Level Two events
double the likelihood of termination while Level Three events increase the odds of termination
by over 66 times. The results from these three models strongly indicate that Level Three events
are censoring opportunities for intervention in civil wars by ending those wars. It is this
censoring which explains the negative correlation between military intervention and Level Three
events in earlier models.
[Tables VI and VII]
Conclusion
The results show that unexpected events, especially unexpected military events, are
significantly correlated with states’ decisions to militarily intervene in ongoing civil wars. This is
true whether or not the data were structured as non-belligerent war-months for politically
relevant states or just as war-months. The results hold for both the COW and PRIO datasets.
These results suggest that such events motivate states to intervene in civil wars and help explain
when intervention occurs. The analysis also shows that unexpected events were correlated with
and likely causal of states exiting civil wars and civil war termination. This is because just like
with intervention, such events cause states to reconsider their decisions about belligerency.
Taken as a whole, these findings lend support to bargaining explanations of war. Such
explanations are compelling only if they can explain initiation, termination, and war expansion
for both interstate and civil wars as the logic of bargaining approaches suggests they should
apply to all of these areas. Given previous work has found support for bargaining explanations of
initiation and termination in both civil and interstate wars as well as intervention in interstate
10

The result holds with shorter, but not longer, lags.
The results for Level Two variables hold for shorter lags, but hold only at the 0.10 level for longer lags. The
results for Level Three variables are not sensitive to the lag chosen.
11
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wars, we can have confidence that the approach is able to explain the full scope and domain of
wars.
Thus, the work shows that certain periods in civil wars, specifically those after
unexpected events, have an increased rate of military intervention and that unexpected events are
more likely to be associated with military intervention than is random noise. This is because
these events reveal information about the balance of forces and intentions of the warring parties,
thereby potentially destroying tacit agreements to not fight between a warring party and a nonbelligerent state. These results are potentially useful for policy makers concerned with containing
civil wars as they suggest when it is most important to undertake robust diplomatic efforts. In
particular, diplomatic efforts to prevent military intervention would be most profitable if they
focused on civil wars where conditions were rapidly changing. Alas, given that unexpected
events by their very nature will come as surprises, preparing ahead of time for such crises would
be quite difficult. Thus, while prediction remains elusive, risk management and a concentration
of effort is possible.
Clearly more research in this area can be done, perhaps on which sort of unexpected
military events are most important, say governmental battlefield defeats, coups, or shifts in
territorial control. Likewise, it could be promising to investigate interactions between geography,
revealed information, and capabilities. Finally, the directionality of events could be examined.
Are states more likely to intervene militarily on behalf of the side that has recently suffered a
setback or on the side which is doing unexpectedly well? This relationship might vary—with
defeats prompting aid for governments and successes generating aid for rebel groups. Even given
these remaining questions, the findings suggest that states need not worry that civil wars where

21

little has changed recently are likely to spread if they have not already done so. That is no small
thing.
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Table I: Probable Settlements and State Motives for Joining
C is Fearful of B’s
Victory—Strong to
moderately weak A
A is Doing Better

C is less likely to
join—A is in less need
of aid

A is Doing Worse

C is more likely to
join—Needs to balance
unless B moderates
demands

C is Fearful of B’s
Victory—Very
weak A
C is more likely to
join—A is now a
more credible
alliance partner
C is less likely to
join—A is too weak
to be a credible
alliance partner

C wants to Capitalize
on B’s Weakness
C is more likely to
join—Can more easily
acquire spoils from B
C is less likely to
join—Scared off by
B’s success

Table II: Examples of Each Level of Unexpected Events
Military Events
Political Events
Level 1

Blackhawk Down Incident—Somalia

Habeas Corpus Suspended—US Civil War

Level 2

Battle of Gettysburg—US Civil War

Emancipation Proclamation—US Civil War

Level 3

FRP Takes Kigali—Second Rwandan

Khomeini returns—Iranian Revolution
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Table IIIa. Descriptive Statistics for COW Dataset Dummy Variables
Non-Belligerent
War-Months
Belligerent WarWar-Months
Models 3–5 and 8
Months Model 9
Models 1–2
Zero
One
Zero
One
Zero
One
Late Joined
87,470
60
9,824
50
--------Termination / Exit
--------9,875
333
11,967
444
Any Event
55,244
32,286
6,367
3,504
--------Level One Event
--------6,966
2,905
8,341
4,070
Level Two Event
--------9,131
740
11,424
987
Level Three Event
--------9,827
44
12,357
54
Military Event
70,942
16,588
8,067
1,804
--------Political Event
68,156
19,374
7,766
2,105
--------Cold War
50,846
36,684
5,576
4,295
6,817
5,594
Internationalized
--------8,326
1,545
8,408
4,003
Great Power in War
--------8,568
1,303
10,119
2,292
Democracy in War
--------8,092
1,779
9,509
2,902
Africa
--------7,451
2,420
8,572
3,839
Europe
--------8,469
1,402
10,585
1,826
Asia and Oceania
--------6,454
3,417
8,636
3,775
Peacekeeping
84,542
2,988
9,538
333
11,533
878
Table IIIb. Descriptive Statistics for COW Continuous Variables
Non-Belligerent WarWar-Months
Belligerent War-Months
Months Models 1–2
Models 3–5 and 8
Model 9
Mean Median St Dev Mean Median St Dev Mean Median St Dev
Duration
43.846
25 49.805 43.143
25 48.367 40.816
24 44.751
Neighbors
------------- 3.917
4
2.747
-------------
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Table IIIc. Descriptive Statistics for PRIO Dataset Dummy Variables
War-Months
Models 6–7 and 10
Zero
One
Late Joining
18,376
45
War Termination
18,082
339
Military Event
15,764
2,657
Level One Military Event
16,235
2,186
Level Two Military Event
17,862
559
Level Three Military Event
18,410
11
Cold War
6,948
11,473
Internationalized
16,454
1,967
Great Power in War
16,953
1,468
Democracy in War
11,712
6,709
Africa
13,218
5,203
Europe
17,557
864
Asia and Oceania
7,773
10,648
Peacekeeping
16,750
1,671
Table IIIId. Descriptive Statistics for PRIO Continuous Variables
War-Months Models 6–7 and 10
Mean Median
St Dev
Min
Max
Duration
102.124
61 112.757
0
575
Neighbors
4.224
4
2.208
0
14
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Table IV: Intervention and Unexpected Events (COW dataset)
Non-Belligerent War-Months
War-Months
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Coefficients
Coefficients
Coefficients Coefficients
Coefficients
and
and
and
and
and
Semi-Robust
Semi-Robust Semi-Robust Semi-Robust Semi-Robust
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Errors
Errors
Errors
Errors
Errors
Any Event
1.440***
----0.899**
--------(0.292)
(0.305)
Military Event
----1.252***
----1.093**
----(0.274)
(0.348)
Political Event
----0.629*
----0.211
----(0.292)
(0.331)
Level One Event
----------------0.278
(0.290)
Level Two Event
----------------1.259**
(0.404)
Level Three
----------------Omitted due
Event
to collinearity
Cold War
-0.495
-0.402
0.131
0.269
0.265
(0.291)
(0.311)
(0.319)
(0.349)
(0.327)
Duration
-0.022***
-0.022***
-0.037**
-0.036**
-0.035**
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.012)
Internationalized
--------0.813
0.721
0.744
(0.418)
(0.431)
(0.421)
Great Power in
---------*-1.325**
**-1.292**-1.261*
War
(0.487)
(0.483)
(0.496)
Democracy in
--------0.914*
0.947*
*1.022**
War
(0.380)
(0.374)
(0.385)
Africa
--------1.054**
1.045*
1.026**
(0.390)
(0.411)
(0.392)
Europe
--------*1.359*** ***1.476***
*1.325***
(0.405)
(0.406)
(0.413)
Asia and
--------0.555
0.605
0.562
Oceania
(0.486)
(0.493)
(0.486)
Peacekeeping
**1.12**
**1.192**
0.292
0.394
0.468
(0.387)
(0.389)
(0.583)
(0.590)
(0.533)
Neighboring
--------0.031
0.038
0.039
States
(0.078)
(0.081)
(0.080)
Constant
-7.370*** -**-7.200***
--6.104***
-6.164***
-6.077***
(0.237)
(0.212)
(0.505)
(0.498)
(0.480)
Observations
87,530
87,530
9,871
9,871
9827
χ2
46.79
65.03
82.63
94.78
99.32
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table V: Intervention and Unexpected Military Events (PRIO dataset)
War-Months
Model 6
Model 7
Coefficients
Coefficients
and
and
Semi-Robust
Semi-Robust
Standard Errors
Standard Errors
Military Event
*0.887*
----(0.382)
Level One Military
----0.078
Event
(0.371)
Level Two Military
----1.724***
Event
(0.431)
Level Three Military
----Omitted due to
Event
collinearity
Duration
-0.006**
-0.005**
(0.002)
(0.002)
Cold War
-0.867*
-0.828*
(0.378)
(0.396)
Internationalized
**1.342***
**1.299**
(0.410)
(0.426)
Great Power in War
0.338
0.295
(0.585)
(0.604)
Democracy In War
0.147
0.140
(0.342)
(0.336)
Africa
-0.184
-0.228
(0.543)
(0.579)
Europe
-2.173
-2.263(1.390)
(1.304)
Asia and Oceania
-0.668
-0.650(0.590)
(0.636)
Peacekeeping
-0.412
-0.282(0.822)
(0.708)
Neighboring States
0.146
*0.152*
(0.075)
(0.071)
Constant
-6.016***
-6.011***
(0.658)
(0.695)
Observations
18,421
18,410
2
χ
71.39
87.00
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table VI: Unexpected Events, War Termination, and State Exit (COW dataset)
War
State Exit:
Termination:
Belligerent
War-Months
War-Months
Model 8
Model 9
Coefficients
Coefficients
and Robust
and Robust
Standard Errors Standard Errors
_t (scale effects)
Level One Event
-0.145-0.179(0.134)
(0.114)
Level Two Event
*0.402*
0.263
(0.172)
(0.156)
Level Three Event
***1.524***
***1.226***
(0.354)
(0.381)
Cold War
***-0.468******-0.470***(0.138)
(0.121)
Internationalized
0.043
0.187
(0.211)
(0.152)
Great Power in War
0.016
-0.723(0.236)
(0.466)
Democracy in War
-0.216-0.228(0.231)
(0.164)
Africa
*-0.347****-0.495***(0.158)
(0.140)
Europe
-0.254**-0.509**(0.187)
(0.170)
Asia and Oceania
**-0.525*****-0.633***(0.171)
(0.152)
Peacekeeping
-1.163*-1.079*(0.601)
(0.511)
Constant
***-2.362******-2.354***(0.140)
(0.134)
ln_p (shape effects)
Peacekeeping
***0.436***
***0.373***
(0.115)
(0.101)
Great Power in War
----*0.237*
(0.111)
Constant
***-0.170******-0.156***(0.040)
(0.037)
9,527
12,018
Observations
63.63
72.31
χ2
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table VII: Unexpected Events and War Termination (PRIO dataset)
War-Months
Model 10
Coefficients
and Robust
Standard Errors
_t (scale effects)
Level One Event
-0.060(0.183)
Level Two Event
**0.561**
(0.216)
Level Three Event
***2.968***
(0.535)
Cold War
-0.123(0.270)
Internationalized
0.094
(0.197)
Great Power in War
0.340
(0.226)
Democracy in War
*-0.416*(0.168)
Africa
**-1.039**(0.355)
Europe
-0.843(0.477)
Asia and Oceania
***-1.073***(0.323)
Peacekeeping
0.102
(0.221)
Constant
***-1.896***(0.324)
ln_p (shape effects)
Cold War
*-0.177*(0.083)
Africa
*0.252*
(0.109)
Europe
**0.362**
(0.141)
Asia and Oceania
**0.266**
(0.094)
Constant
***-0.432***(0.096)
17,992
Observations
65.33
χ2
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Unexpected Events Variables (Models 1–2)
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Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Unexpected Events Variables (Models 3–5)
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